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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROC-
ESS CLAUSE-CRIMINAL LAW- IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES-
The United States Supreme Court has held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not compel a state
criminal trial court to conduct a hearing outside the jury's pres-
ence to determine the admissibility of identification evidence
whenever a defendant contends that a witness's identification of
him was arrived at improperly.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
On January 11, 1975, four men attempted to rob a Louisville,
Kentucky liquor store where Walter Smith and Donald Goeing
were working. During the course of the attempted robbery, one
of the men shot Goeing twice. The four men then fled.'
Later that night, both Smith and Goeing gave the police de-
scriptions of the man who had fired the shots.' Two days after
the attempted robbery, the police conducted a lineup consisting
of John Gregory Watkins and two other black men. Smith identi-
fied Watkins as the man who had shot Goeing.3 Later that day,
the police took Watkins to Goeing's hospital room where Goeing
also identified him as the assailant.' Watkins was then charged
with robbery in the first degree and first degree assault.'
Prior to Watkins' trial, the defense counsel filed a written mo-
1. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 342 (1981). Upon entering the store,
one of the men approached the counter where Smith was working and asked for
a pack of cigarettes. As Smith turned to get the cigarettes, the man announced
that it was a holdup. At this point Goeing, a part owner of the store who was
filling a soda machine, turned toward the man at the counter, whereupon the
man shot Goeing twice, once in the arm and once in the chest. Id. at 342.
2. Id. Smith described the man as a black male with a light complexion,
between thirty and thirty-five years old, and about five feet, nine inches tall.
Goeing described the robber as a young black man with a light complexion.
Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
3. 449 U.S. at 342-43. Smith testified at trial that at the time of the lineup
he had not been "completely sure" that Watkins was the robber. 608 F.2d at
249.
4. 449 U.S. at 343. Goeing states, however, that "it could have been close
enough that it could have been his twin brother, it could have been somebody
else." 608 F.2d at 249.
5. 449 U.S. at 343. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.010(1), 515.020(1)
(Baldwin 1981).
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tion for a suppression hearing on the identification testimony. At
trial, before any evidence was presented and out of the jury's
presence, counsel reasserted this motion, which was denied., Both
Smith and Goeing then made in-court identifications of Watkins
as the gunman. The prosecutor did not introduce any evidence of
the previous identifications at the lineup or the showup, but the
defense counsel cross-examined both Smith and Goeing concern-
ing the details of the identification procedures used.' Two
witnesses for the defense testified that Watkins was in a pool
hall at the time of the incident, and another witness stated that
he had been present in the liquor store during the robbery and
had not seen Watkins there. Watkins also took the stand and
professed innocence! The jury returned a verdict of guilty on
both charges,' and the trial court sentenced Watkins to twenty
years' imprisonment on each charge. 10
On appeal, the defense counsel reasserted his argument that
the trial court was constitutionally required to conduct a sup-
pression hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine
the admissibility of the identification evidence and that the re-
fusal to do so and the failure to suppress the identification evi-
dence deprived Watkins of a fair trial." The Supreme Court of
Kentucky ruled that while holding such a hearing would have
been the preferred course, the trial court's refusal to do so did
not require the reversal of Watkins' conviction. 2
6. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 630 (1978). Prior to the intro-
duction of the identification testimony of Smith and Goeing, defense counsel ob-
jected to the denial of an in camera, (i.e., out of the jury's presence) hearing
because it forced him to explore the circumstances of the identification proce-
dures in the presence of the jury. The objection was overruled. Repeated mo-
tions for a mistrial on this basis were also denied. Id. at 630.
7. 449 U.S. at 343. A showup is a pretrial identification procedure in
which the suspect is exhibited to a witness or to a victim of a crime, usually in
a one-on-one confrontation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (5th ed. 1981). A
police officer testified for the prosecution that he had used the showup proce-
dure because at the time he was uncertain Goeing would survive the shooting.
The defense counsel also cross-examined the officer on the details of the lineup
and the showup and introduced pictures of the lineup into evidence.
8. 449 U.S. at 343.
9. 608 F.2d at 249.
10. 565 S.W.2d at 630.
11. Id. at 631. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. "
12. 565 S.W.2d at 631. The court quoted from its previous decision in Ray
v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Ky. 1977), and noted that the evidence
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Watkins then petitioned the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court denied the petition, holding that although a pretrial
suppression hearing on an identification question is preferable to
the presentation of the entire identification case in the presence
of the jury, the failure to hold such a hearing did not violate
Watkins' due process rights.13
Watkins appealed the denial of the writ to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit which affirmed the district court's judgment
and held that an in camera hearing on the admissibility of the
identification evidence was not constitutionally mandated." The
court further found that because of the seriousness of Goeing's
wounds, a showup was necessary and constitutionally permis-
sible.15 Noting that the admissibility of the lineup identification
presented a very close question, the court nevertheless found
the evidence admissible based on the totality of the circum-
stances of the case. l6
A companion case presented the same issue in a somewhat dif-
ferent factual setting. On the night of July 20, 1974, two men
forced a young woman into their car and drove to an isolated area
where one of the men raped her. The next day she described the
rapist17 to the police and viewed approximately 1200 mug shots,
failed to raise any question of impermissible suggestiveness and that Watkins
was not prejudiced by its admission. Id.
13. 449 U.S. at 344. The Memorandum Opinion of the District Court is un-
reported. See Brief for Petitioners, Appendix at 38-45, Watkins v. Sowders, 449
U.S. 341 (1981). The district court explained that because Watkins was afforded
and exercised the opportunity to cross-examine both Smith and Goeing on their
identification testimony, he had not been denied due process. The court further
observed that neither the lineup nor the showup procedures violated Watkin's
due process rights inasmuch as the showup was necessary due to the serious-
ness of Goeing's injuries and the lineup was not unduly suggestive. Id.
14. 608 F.2d at 251.
15. Id. at 252 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)).
16. 608 F.2d at 252-53. The court observed that the lineup had employed
the key element of the witnesses' description, lightness of complexion, to call
attention to Watkins rather than to the other two men in the lineup, who were of
somewhat darker complexion. The court noted that this feature of the lineup
probably could have been avoided, but found that despite the unnecessary ele-
ment of suggestiveness, the identifiction by Smith was sufficiently reliable that
there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification. Id. at 252.
17. Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1977). A police officer
testified at Summitt's trial that the victim had described the rapist as a white
male in his thirties, approximtely five feet, nine inches tall, 180 to 190 pounds,
with a rough complexion and tattoos on both arms. The description was given
prior to the victim's perusal of any of the mug shots. Id. at 549.
1982]
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but she was unable to identify any of these photographs as that
of her assailant. Two days later she viewed more photographs at
a different police station and identified a picture of James
Willard Summitt as that of the rapist. 8 Summit was subse-
quently arrested and charged with rape.9
Summitt's counsel filed a motion to suppress or exclude any in-
court identification of Summitt by the victim. Prior to the introduc-
tion of the prosecution's first witness at trial, the defense counsel
sought an evidentiary hearing on his suppression motion; the
hearing request was denied. 0 A police detective then testified to
the certainty with which the prosecutrix had identified Summitt's
photograph, and the prosecutrix testified that Summitt was the
man who had raped her. 1 The defense counsel cross-examined
both witnesses extensively.' The jury returned a verdict of guil-
ty and Summitt was sentenced to life imprisonment.3
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Summitt's counsel
reiterated his argument that the trial court erred by refusing to
conduct a pretrial hearing outside the jury's presence on his mo-
tion to suppress the in-court identification of his client by the
prosecutrix. The court found that there was no error in the re-
fusal to hold the hearing and that there was no semblance of im-
permissible suggestiveness in the photographic identification
procedure .24
Summitt then petitioned the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court denied the writ, holding that it was unable to find any
18. 449 U.S. at 344.
19. 550 S.W.2d at 549. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1) (Baldwin
1981). Summitt was charged with violating KY. REV. STAT. § 435.090, which was
superseded by the Kentucky Penal Code on January 1, 1975. 550 S.W.2d at 549.
20. 550 S.W.2d at 550.
21. 449 U.S. at 344-45. The prosecutrix testified that she got a good look at
her assailant in the light immediately after she was abducted, and that upon
viewing the photographs, she "knew his face right away . . ." and "picked him
right out of there." 550 S.W.2d at 550.
22. 449 U.S. at 345. Under cross-examination the prosecutrix virgorously
resisted the implication of defense counsel that her in-court identification of
Summitt had been strengthened by having seen the accused several times at
pretrial court appearances. 550 S.W.2d at 550.
23. 550 S.W.2d at 549.
24. Id. at 550. The court found that the identification procedure was consti-
tutionally acceptable within the standard announced in Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1978). Id. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights in the identifica-
tion procedure and that there was no error in the trial court's
refusal to conduct the requested evidentiary hearing. 5 On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court consoli-
dated Summitt's case with Watkins' and likewise found the chal-
lenged identification procedure to be neither suggestive, unreli-
able, nor constitutionally improper, and therefore affirmed the
judgment of the district court."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether due
process requires a state trial court to conduct a hearing outside
the presence of the jury on the admissibility of identification evi-
dence. 7 The Court held that the due process clause of the four
teenth amendment does not require such a hearing.28
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,' noted that the
issue presented was not whether it is prudent for the trial court to
hold a hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence out-
side the jury's presence, 0 but whether such a hearing is required
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1
Justice Stewart observed that the petitioners had cited the
Court's previous holdings that a defendant is entitled to the
presence of counsel at a post-indictment lineup,32 and that an
identification procedure, in the absence of a lineup, may be so
25. 449 U.S. at 345. The Memorandum Opinion of the District Court is un-
reported. See Brief for Petitioners, Appendix at 117-20.
26. 449 U.S. at 345. The court also held that because Summitt had received
an independent determination of the reliability of the identification evidence by
the trial court and an adequate hearing on the issue, the procedure used for de-
termining the admissibility of the identification evidence was not a denial of
due process. 608 F.2d at 250-51.
27. 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
28. 449 U.S. at 349.
29. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in the majority opinion. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
30. 449 U.S. at 345. Justice Stewart noted that many decisions of the
courts of appeals had endorsed the holding of such a hearing, and most had ad-
monished trial courts to adopt the procedure. Id. at 345 & n.2.
31. Id. at 346.
32. Id. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Wade Court ex-
tended the sixth amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel to "critical
stages" of criminal prosecutions, specifically to the post-indictment lineup. 388
U.S. at 236-37. U. S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part that "[in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense."
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unreliable as to amount to a denial of due process of law.33 More-
over, he noted that the petitioners asserted that the Court, in
Jackson v. Denno,4 had established a per se rule requiring a
hearing outside of the jury's presence whenever the volun-
tariness of a confession is at issue, and that if the due process
standard of fairness requires such a hearing in the case of a chal-
lenged confession, it requires such a hearing as well in the case
of a challenged identification. 5 The Watkins majority, however,
found this reasoning unpersuasive. Noting that while the
Jackson Court had decided that a jury could not be relied upon
to follow the trial judge's instruction to disregard a confession if
they found it to be involuntary, Justice Stewart explained that
the basis for this decision was grounded not only upon the con-
cern for the potential unreliability of such a confession, but also
upon the fundamental societal revulsion to coerced confessions.'
33. 449 U.S. at 346. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall,
the Court found that a confrontation between an accused and an identifying wit-
ness was a "critical stage", requiring the presence of counsel at. all such confron-
tations, 388 U.S. at 298, and that an identification procedure might be "so unne-
cessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification . . ."
as to constitute a denial of due process. Id. at 302. The determination of
whether an alleged denial of due process had occurred was to be made on the
basis of "the totality of the circumstances . . ." of the confrontation. Id.
34. Compare Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The Jackson Court
asserted that a defendant who objected to the admission of a confession was "en-
titled to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-
tariness ...... Id. at 377. The voluntariness of the confession in Jackson was
questioned because the defendant had been interrogated by police officers while
he was hopitalized for serious gunshot wounds and after he had been given
doses of demerol and scopolamine. Id. at 371-72. See infra note 36.
35. 449 U.S. at 346. The Court noted that it had never held that all volun-
tariness hearings must be held outside the jury's presence, regardless of the
circumstances, although it would seem prudent to hold them in that manner. Id.
at 346 n.3. See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 (1967).
36. 449 U.S. at 347. See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 374 n.5, 376-86. Jackson struck
down the New York procedure whereby the trial judge made a preliminary
determination of the voluntariness of a confession offered in evidence by the
prosecution, but excluded it only if in no circumstances could it be found to
have been given voluntarily. If there was a question of the voluntariness of the
confession such that reasonable men could differ about the inferences to be
drawn from the facts, the trial judge was compelled to leave both the issues of
voluntariness and truthfulness to the resolution of the jury. Of course, the trial
judge would instruct the jury that if they found the confession to be involun-
tary, they were to exclude it completely from consideration in determining the
accused's guilt or innocence. Id. at 377-78. Compare Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953) (holding New York procedures for determining voluntariness of confes-
sions constitutionally permissible).
674 [Vol. 20:637
Recent Decisions
Justice Stewart observed that the Jackson Court had concluded
that because a jury might have difficulty excluding from consid-
eration a confession which was involuntary but which they be-
lieved to be true, their findings on the voluntariness issue were
likely to be unreliable. 7
By comparsion, however, the Watkins majority emphasized
that where identification evidence is in question no special con-
siderations exist to justify the assertion that the jury will be un-
able to follow the trial judge's instructions." The Court noted
that the admissibility of identification evidence is primarily a
question of its reliability' and that our legal system assumes
that juries can properly evaluate evidence with adequate instruc-
tions." The Court recognized that identification evidence is im-
portant, but stressed that unlike the assistance of counsel it is
not a factor which goes to the fundamental fairness of the adver-
sary process. 1 The Court concluded that cross-examination and
summation provide adequate opportunities for defense counsel to
expose any inaccuracy or suggestiveness.'2 Thus, while conceding
37. 449 U.S. at 347. The concern of the Jackson Court was that the jury
would unconsciously respond to the pressure to find a confession voluntary be-
cause they believed it to be true; if the other evidence bearing on the accused's
guilt were insufficient to convict, the jury would be faced with the prospect of
seeing a "guilty" defendant go free. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 382.
38. 449 U.S. at 347.
39. Id. In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the Court had emphasized
that the reliability of identification evidence was of paramount importance, and
that the likelihood of misidentification, not the suggestiveness of the identifica-
tion procedure, deprived an accused of due process. Id. at 198. See also Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977) (reliability is the linchpin in determin-
ing the admissibility of identification testimony); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 384 (1968); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 402-04
(7th Cir. 1975) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
40. 449 U.S. at 347. The Court noted that assessing the reliability of identi-
fication evidence is frequently the only function the jury performs in cases such
as Watkins. Id.
41. Id. at 348. The Court cited its opinion in Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 n.14
(quoting Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Leven-
thal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969)). See also United States ex
rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d at 406 (showup does not violate any constitu-
tional right of the suspect).
42. 449 U.S. at 348. The Court cited Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 n.14. The ma-
jority noted the petitioners' contention that cross-examination is an inadequate
method for testing the reliability of pretrial identification procedures because,
while attempting to elicit information about possible procedural improprieties,
defense counsel will be simultaneously emphasizing to the jury the fact that the
witness has previously identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime,
1982]
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that a hearing by the trial court outside the jury's presence to
determine the admissibility of identification evidence might often
be advisable, and in some cases might even be constitutionally
required, the Watkins majority found no constitutional require-
ment for such a hearing in every case.4"
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, asserted that the due
process clause mandates a hearing outside the jury's presence on
the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence whenever
the accused offers some evidence that pretrial identification pro-
cedures were impermissibily suggestive." He found in identifica-
tion evidence characteristics sufficiently similar to those which
had led the Jackson Court to conclude that a jury could not be
relied upon to follow a trial judge's instructions. According to
Justice Brennan, a separate judicial determination of admissibili-
ty was required in both situations because jury instructions
could not cure the erroneous admission of identification evidence
any more than they could cure the erroneous admission of a con-
fession.4'
Justice Brennan noted that several of the Court's previous deci-
sions involving eyewitness identification testimony had stressed
its unreliability,4" a characteristic which had caused the Court to
thereby bolstering the in-court identification. Id. The petitioners also argued
that because of counsel's reluctance to explore fully the circumstances of the
pretrial identification confrontation in the presence of the jury, questions which
counsel might otherwise have asked the witness had been foregone. The result
might be that serious flaws in the procedure would remain unexposed, and the
accused would be denied effecitve assistance of counsel. Brief for Petitioners at
26-27. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240-41. The Court observed,
however, that the petitioners did not cite any specific instances during trial
where their counsel were deterred from cross-examining the identifying wit-
nesses, and that the record revealed that there had been extensive cross-exami-
nation on the identification procedures. 449 U.S. at 348. Moreover, the Court
declared that this is precisely the problem that every trial lawyer must face
when he decides to ask a question on cross-examination which may evoke an
answer unfavorable to his client. Id. at 349.
43. 449 U.S. at 349.
44. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 350-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Mason v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 111-12; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 & n.6. See generally
E. LOFTUS, EYE-WITNESS TESTIMONY 8-19 (1979) (impact on jury of eyewitness
identification testimony); N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, LEGAL ANDPRAC-
TICAL PROBLEMS §§ 1.1, 1.3 (2d ed. 1981) (identification evidence, without more
to connect defendant with the crime, generally understood to be the least reli-
able of all classes of evidence); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal
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require the presence of counsel at a post-indictment lineup 7 and
to exclude identification evidence which was the product of a
suggestive confrontation and which lacked sufficient indicia of re-
liability. 8 He asserted that these holdings indicated that the
Court's intent was to prevent the jury from being exposed to un-
reliable identification evidence. 9
The dissenter then observed that despite the inherent unrelia-
bility of identification evidence, its impact on a jury is powerful
and convincing, especially when the testimony is presented with
a high degree of confidence. 0 Justice Brennan contended that
these two attributes of identification evidence virtually compel
the conclusion that when such evidence is inadmissible, the jury
should not be exposed to it at all, because instructions by the
trial judge to disregard it will prove inadequate to counter its
prejudicial effect on the accused.5 1 Reviewing the essential ele-
ments of the Jackson decision and comparing them to the situa-
tion in Watkins, the dissenter concluded that the similarity of
these considerations required a similar result in Watkins.52
Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973)
(physical and psychological limitations and their effects on the reliability of eye-
witness identifications); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psycholo-
gical Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Did Your Eyes Deceive You?] (unreliability
of eyewitness testimony, present safeguards for defendants, proposed solutions
of the problem in legal context).
47. 449 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. at 236-37. See also infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
48. 449 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 114; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). See also infra
notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
49. 449 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. Justice Brennan noted that the testimony of an eyewitness to a crime
has an inordinately persuasive effect on a jury, and quoted Professor Loftus's
statement that "[tihere is almost nothing more convincing than a live human be-
ing who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'That's the
one!"' Id. at 352 (quoting E. LOFTUS, supra note 46, at 19).
51. 449 U.S. at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 354-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, the use of coercively ob-
tained confessions is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment because of their
probable unreliability. Justice Brennan averred that identification evidence is at
least as unreliable. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 46 and ac-
companying text. Second, the use of involuntary confessions is forbidden by the
fourteenth amendment because of societal attitudes which deplore the use of
coercion by police. 449 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stressed that
the use of impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedures is equally
repugnant. Id. at 355-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Third, because of the danger
19821,
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Justice Brennan also found the majority's reliance on cross-ex-
amination to protect the accused misplaced, for defense counsel
could cross-examine on the voluntariness issue in the Jackson situa-
tions as well.5 Noting that cross-examination does effect the
weight and credibility which the jury affords to testimony, he
observed nevertheless that it is an ineffective method for ensur-
ing that a jury will ignore inadmissible identification evidence."
He explained that the jury instruction, not cross-examination, is
the tool designed to cure the effects of the erroneous admission
of evidence. In the dissenter's view, the only practical solution to
this problem is to preclude the jury's exposure to such inadmissi-
ble evidence in the first place, a result which a Jackson hearing
would accomplish.' Justice Brennan observed that most of the
lower federal courts have encouraged the use of the type of hear-
ing sought by the petitioners," and suggested that a rule requir-
ing the defendant to make a minimal showing of impermissibly
suggestive police procedures in order to be entitled to such a
hearing would eliminate frivolous requests.
57
that a jury will be influenced by an involuntary confession despite its inadmissi-
bility, jury instructions have been found inadequate to protect a defendant's
due process rights. Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenter found it
equally improbable that a jury will be immune to the impact of powerful eye-
witness identification testimony even under proper instructions from the trial
judge. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See E. LOFTUS, supra note 46, at
189-90.
53. 449 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan states that cross
examination, no matter how skillful, would be unlikely to offset the effect of er-
roneously admitted identification evidence because of its peculiarly convincing
impact on the jury. Id. See E. LOFTUS, supra note 46, at 9, 19.
55. 449 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mitchell, 540 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975); United States v. Cranson, 453 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 409 (1972); Haskins v. United States, 433 F.2d 836
(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ranciglio, 429 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 959 (1970); United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d
1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Allison, 414
F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 (1969); Clemons v. United States,
408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969).
57. 449 U.S. at 354 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted
that the petitioners had raised a colorable claim that the confrontation proce-
dure were impermissible suggestive, and cited with approval the approach
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Justice Brennan would remand the case for further proceedings
to determine whether the identification evidence was erroneous-
ly admitted, because in his view the record was inadequate to
decide that the petitioners would have been unsuccesful in hav-
ing the evidence excluded had they been afforded a hearing out
of the jury's presence.'
The Supreme Court has held for the first time that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require a
judicial determination out of the presence of the jury of the ad-
missibility of pretrial identification evidence whenever an accused
contends that the identification procedure was improperly sugges-
tive. In reaching this decision, the Court has further refined the
limitations which the Constitution imposes upon criminal prose-
cutions for the protection of defendants when identification
issues are raised, an inquiry which the Court began in earnest in
1967 in United States v. Wade."
In Wade, the Court expressed concerns that because of the
well-known unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony
and the consequent likelihood of misidentification,0 coupled with
the grave risk of suggestiveness inherent in lineup procedures,"
an accused who was forced to undergo a pretrial lineup without
the assistance of counsel might be derpived of any meaningful
opportunity thereafter to demonstrate what actually occurred
and to attack the basis for the witness's in-court identification.".
The Court concluded that this would violate the accused's sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him through
cross-examination. 3 The Court, therefore, extended the sixth
amendment right to counsel to the pretrial, post-indictment
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit requiring a defendant to
make such a showing and thereby eliminating frivolous requests for pretrial
suppression hearings. See United States ex rel. Fisher v. Driber, 546 F.2d 18,
22 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. 449 U.S. at 359-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See Levine & Tapp, supra note 46, at 1079.
60. 388 U.S. at 228-29.
61. Id. at 229-30.
62. Id. at 230-32.
63. Id. at 235. The Court noted that "even though cross-examination is a
precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assurance
of accuracy and reliability." Id. The Court also observed that without counsel
present at a lineup, the crucial identification issue might be determined before
trial, id. at 229, and any assistance provided by counsel at trial might hence be
ineffective. Id. at 235.
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lineup. 4 The Court was also reluctant, however, to exclude valid
and reliable identification testimony. Consequently, the Court
further held that an in-court identification would not be held in-
admissible per se even when the accused had been previously
identified at a lineup held in the absence of counsel if the prose-
cution could show by clear and convincing evidence that the in-
court identification was based upon observations other than
those made at the lineup. 5 Thus the Wade Court sought to ac-
commodate the often conflicting goals of protection of the rights
of the accused and the enhancement of effective law enforce-
ment.
In Gilbert v. California,"6 a companion case to Wade, the Court
applied the Wade holdings to the states 7 and also announced a
per se exclusionary rule to be applied to testimony that a wit-
ness had previously identified the accused at a lineup in the ab-
sence of counsel. 8 Because the prosecution in Gilbert had elicited
the testimony of the previous lineup identification on direct ex-
amination,69 the Court would not allow the prosecution to show
64. Id. at 237. Although the Wade Court noted that whether the presence
of counsel was necessary to ensure the defendant a fair trial, in the context of
the right to cross-examine meaningfully the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at trial, required the scrutiny of any pretrial con-
frontation, id. at 227, the Court subsequently limited the application of the
Wade decision to its factual setting, i.e., a post-indictment lineup. See Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to assistance of counsel attaches only at or
after initiation of adversary judicial proceedings).
65. 388 U.S. at 239-40. The Wade Court stated that the proper test was
that set out in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963): "[W]hether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Magurie, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)." 388 U.S. at 241.
66. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Gilbert was exhibited to over 100 witnesses to the
various robberies charged to him in a lineup conducted after indictment and ap-
pointment of counsel but without notice to defense counsel. Id. at 269-70 & n.2.
Three witnesses to the crime for which Gilbert was subsequently convicted
made in-court identification during the guilt stage of the trial. Id. at 269. Eight
other witnesses to othe robberies allegedly committed by Gilbert made in-court
identifications during the penalty stage and also testified that they had
previously identified Gilbert at the lineup. Id. at 269-70.
67. Id. at 272. Wade was a federal trial.
68. Id. at 272-73. The Gilbert Court noted that such testimony was the
"direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] il-
legality."' Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488).
69. 388 U.S. at 269-70.
680 [Vol. 20:637
Recent Decisions
that the testimony had an independent basis. The Gilbert Court
determined that only such a sanction would ensure that the
state's law enforcement officials would henceforth respect the ac-
cused's right to the presence of counsel at the lineup."0
The third decision in the Wade trilogy was Stoval v. Denno,71
in which the Court considered whether a confrontation proce-
dure in and of itself could be so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deprive an
accused of due process of law."2 The Court held that an alleged
violation of due process in the conduct of an identification con-
frontation was to be determined on the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding it.73 Nevertheless, because the Court found
no violation of due process due to the exigent circumstances of
the case, it did not specify what sanctions might be appropriate
for violation of this "due process" standard for pretrial confron-
tation procedures.74 In light of the holdings in Wade and Gilbert,
however, it would seem to be implicit that such a violation would
require exclusion of direct testimony concerning the suggestive
pretrial identification unless exigent circumstances existed to
justify the use of such a procedure. Similarly, any in-court identi-
fication of a defendant who had undergone an unnecessarily sug-
gestive pretrial confrontation procedure should be inadmissible
70. Id. at 272-73.
71. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall were argued together
and announced on the same day. Id. at 296.
72. 388 U.S. at 301-02. Stovall was arrested on a murder charge and ex-
hibited to the wife of the victim while she was hospitalized for treatment of
stab wounds inflicted during the assault on her husband. Stovall, the only black
man in the room, was handcuffed to one of the police officers during the con-
frontation. The victim identified him as the assailant. At trial, she testified con-
cerning the hospital identification and made an in-court identification of Stovall.
Id. at 295. The Stovall Court noted that while showups had been widely con-
demned by commentators, the circumstances of the case made the procedure
imperative and a conventional lineup was out of the question. Id. at 302 & n.6.
73. Id. at 302. Despite the suggestive nature of the confrontation and the
absence of counsel, the Wade and Gilbert holdings were of no benefit to Stovall
because the Court declined to apply them retroactively. Id. at 296.
74. See N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 4,2(a). Judge Sobel noted that while the
Court found such a violation in Foster v. California, it remained the case
without specifying the exclusionary sanctions deemed applicable. Judge Sobel
pointed out that despite the lack of direction from the Supreme Court, lower
courts unanimously applied the same sanctions for a due process violations as
they applied to right to cousel violations prior to the Court's subsequent deci-
sion in Biggers. Id. See also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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unless the prosecution could show that the identification was the
product of an independent source."5
One year later, the Court again had occasion to consider the
issue of due process in pretrial identification procedures. In Sim-
mons v. United States,"6 a case dealing with a pre-indictment iden-
tification by examination of photographs, the Court recognized
that such a procedure was likely to result in some erroneous
identifications, but was unwilling to prohibit its use, noting that
it was widely and effectively used by the police and that it
spared innocent suspects the humiliation of arrest by allowing
them to be cleared by the witness by process of elimination.77
The Court held that each case of allegedly improper identifica-
tion must be considered on its own facts, and convictions based
on pretrial photographic identification would be overturned only
if they were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
Thus, in Simmons, the Court further defined the limits of due
process protection and again expressed an awareness of the ten-
sion between the rights of the accused and the effectiveness of
law enforcement. While articulating what might appear to be a
more stringent burden of proof as to the degree of suggestive-
ness necessary to constitute a denial of due process, 9 the Simmons
75. See Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 46, at 993.
76. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Simmons was convicted of robbery after several
bank employees identified him upon being shown several photographs by FBI
agents while Simmons was still at large. Id. at 380-81. Defense counsel did not
argue that Simmons was entitled to have counsel present while the photo-
graphs were being shown to the witnesses, but relied solely on the Stovall due
process test. Id. at 383.
77. Id. at 383-84.
78. Id. at 384. In applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Sim-
mons Court noted first that the use of photographic identification was neces-
sary because the robbers were still at large and it was essential that the police
determined whether they were investigating the correct suspects, a justifica-
tion "hardly less compelling than that which we found to justify the 'one-man
lineup' in Stovall v. Denno .... Id. at 384-85. The Court also discussed various
external factors which let it to conclude that there was little likelihood of mis-
identification in this case: the witnesses had observed the robbers for up to five
minutes in good light; the robbers wore no masks; the witnesses viewed the
photographs one day after the robbery while their memories were still fresh;
the witnesses were certain of their identifications of Simmons. Id. at 385. The
Court also noted that while the mechanics of the identification procedure were
less than ideal, id. at 385-86 & n.6, there was no evidence of improper sugges-
tion on the part of the police. Id. at 385.
79. See Brief for Petitioners at 20.
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Court pronounced its holding to be in accord with the Stovall stan-
dard."
In 1972, in Neil v. Biggers,"l the Court reviewed its recent deci-
sions on the identification issue and sought to synthesize their
holdings.82 It concluded that the primary evil to be avoided is the
likelihood of misidentification, not the suggestiveness of the con-
frontation.' The Court stated that the central question is
whether the identification is reliable despite the suggestiveness
of the confrontation" and enunciated five factors to be consid-
ered in evaluating the probability of misidentification.1 Thus the
Stoval-Simmons standard of a very substantial likelihood of mis-
identification would determine the admissibility of both in-court
identifications and testimony concerning pretrial identifications."
Finally, in Manson v. Brathwaite,87 the Court applied the Big-
gers analysis to post-Stovall confrontations, holding that the ad-
mission of testimony obtained by means of an unnecessarily sug-
gestive identification procedure does not violate due process so
long as the identification itself possesses sufficient aspects of re-
80. 390 U.S. at 384. Compare Foster v. California, 394 U.S. at 442, where
the Court quoted the Stovall standard that "identification procedures may be
'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica-
tion' as to be a denial of due process of law." Id. The Foster Court cited Sim-
mons as a basic source that supports the quoted standard. Id.
81. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Biggers was convicted of rape after being identified
by the victim in a police station showup held seven months after the incident.
At the trial the victim testified *concerning her pretrial identification of the
defendant. Id. at 195.
82. Id. at 196-98. The Biggers Court reviewed Stovall, Simmons, Foster,
and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (evidence could support a finding
that in-court identification was based upon independent source).
83. 409 U.S. at 198. The Biggers Court observed that suggestive pretrial
identification procedures are disapproved because they increase the likelihood
of misidentification, and unnecessarily increase the probability that any
resulting misidentification will be gratuitous. Id.
84. Id. at 198-99. Judge Sobel has stated that the holding in Biggers "is
very close to a holding that if a confession is 'reliable' or 'truthful' it does not
matter that it was 'involuntary' or 'coerced'." N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 3.3(a).
He also noted that the Biggers analysis implies that the "denial of fundamental
fairness.. ." inherent in a showup does not violate due process. Id.
85. These factors are: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the time of the crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness's prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation. 409 U.S. at 198-99.
86. 409 U.S. at 198.
87. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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liability.' The reliability of the identification is to be determined
by consideration of the factors set out in Biggers,89 weighed
against the corrupting influence of the suggestive identification
procedure."
While the foregoing cases deal primarily with the issue of
whether eyewitness identification testimony is admissible, they
are of importance in analyzing the Watkins holding because
Watkins, in essence, raises the issue of how, or more precisely
where, such a determination is to be made, and by whom.91
Because both petitioners' identification proceedings preceded
their indictment,92 neither was entitled to the assistance of
counsel during the identification procedure.93 Thus each peti-
tioner's identification procedure is to be judged by the Stovall-
Simmons due process test,9 4 as construed in Brathwaite.95
By analogy to the Court's holding in Jackson, the petitioners
assert that an in camera hearing is required to determine the ad-
missibility of identification evidence by applying the Brathwaite
88. Id. at 106. The Brathwaite Court rejected the per se approach applied
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which required exclusion of
testimony concerning an out-of-court identification without regard to the
reliability of the identification whenever it was the product of an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure. Id. at 110-13.
89. Id. at 114. See supra note 85.
90. 409 U.S. at 114. The Brathwaite Court observed that in the instant
case there was little pressure on the witness to make an identification, and that
the witness had made the identification while alone "in circumstances allowing
care and reflection." Id. at 116.
91. See Brief for Petitioners at 9.
92. Brief for Respondent at 14 n.5.
93. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 688. See also United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300 (1973) (Wade right to counsel does not apply to photographic iden-
tifications).
94. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. Stovall at least impliedly
suggested that an accused had a fourteenth amendment right to a lineup which
was conducted in a fundamental fair manner. See Manson v. Barthwaite, 432
U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, this construction is untenable
after Brathwaite, for despite the suggestiveness of the procedure, the iden-
tification is admissible if it possesses sufficient indicia of reliability based upon
a consideration of factors which are irrelevant to the fairness of the procedures.
See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying test. The reliability of the identifica-
tion based upon these factors is then weighed against the corrupting effect of
the procedure. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. The result is
therefore much akin to the use of the Wade independent source test. See Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Did Your Eyes
Deceive You?, supra note 46 at 998.
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balancing test and that failure to hold such a hearing is tanta-
mount to allowing the jury to decide a question of law." How-
ever, the logic of Jackson does not support such an assertion.
The New York procedure struck down in Jackson permitted the
jury to decide a question of law, i.e., the voluntariness of a con-
fession and hence its admissibility, prior to its determination of
the credibility of the confession, a question of fact." No such de-
termination by the jury was made in Watkins; the trial court
found the eyewitness identification admissible, and the jury ap-
parently found it to be credible."" It appears that the real ques-
tion the petitioners were asking the Court to decide was whether
the jury can be relied upon to disregard eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony under proper instructions from the trial judge
when such testimony is determined to be inadmissible after the
jury has heard it." On the record in Watkins, however, no such
question is presented, and thus the issue is not properly before
the Court. Moreover, in the factual context of a "pure" identifica-
tion case such as this,1" it is unlikely that such an issue would
arise because exclusion of the prosecution's identification
evidence would virtually compel dismissal of the case.
The petitioners' second argument is essentially that they were
denied their sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel
because defense counsel were forced to explore the details of the
pretrial confrontation procedures in the presence of the jury and
were thereby prevented from demonstrating the unfairness of
the pretrial confrontations. 10 In order to allow the trial court to
make an informed decision on the admissibility of the identifica-
tion testimony, defense counsel must be able to demonstrate the
existence and extent of any impermissible suggestiveness in the
identification procedure, i.e., the corrupting influence articulated
in Brathwaite. In a pure identification case, however, the identi-
fication procedure will almost invariably precede the information
96. Brief for Petitioners at 22-23.
97. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 388. See also Brief for Respondent at 19.
98. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d at 251.
99. See Brief for Petitioners at 30-33. See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449
U.S. at 350, 352-53 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Brief for Petitioners at 4 & 7. Judge Sobel defines a "pure" identifica-
tion case as one in which there is no other evidence but the eyewitness iden-
tification that tends to establish the guilt of the accused. N. SOBEL, supra note
46, § 1.3.
101. Brief for Petitioners at 24-30
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or indictment, because without the identification there will be in-
sufficient evidence to justify an arrest or indictment. 2 Thus, in
accordance with the Court's ruling in Kirby v. Illinois,'03 defense
counsel will not be present. This leaves the accused in precisely
the same tenuous position which led the Court to fashion the
Wade protections. ' However, as the respondent pointed out,
there was extensive discovery of the details of both petitioners'
identification procedures by defense counsel prior to trial,0 5 and
defense counsel had equal access to witnesses for pretrial inter-
views."6 The Court observed that cross-examination on the iden-
tification issue was active and extended 0 7 and noted that the pe-
titioners were unable to show any specific instances during the
trial where their counsel were hampered by the presence of the
jury.18
Furthermore, the petitioners' second argument is dependent
on the alleged impermissible suggestiveness of the pretrial con-
frontations. However, Brathwaite holds that the admission of
testimony concerning an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure does not violate due process so long as the identifica-
tion possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.1 9 Here, both the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found that Summitt'S identification procedure was neither
suggestive nor unreliable,110 and that while the identification pro-
cedures to which Watkins was subjected were to some degree sug-
gestive, they were not impermissibly so, but were sufficiently
reliable that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
102. See N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 1.3.
103. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See supra note 64 and text accompanying note 93.
104. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 230-32, 235.
105. Brief for Respondent at 14-15. The brief notes that Summitt's counsel
moved for and was granted discovery of all photographs viewed by the prosecu-
trix, and that Watkin's counsel discovered a photograph of the lineup and infor-
mation about the hospital showup and introduced this evidence at the trial. Id.
However, petitioners contend in their Brief that none of the photographs in
Summitt's case were produced at or before trial. Brief for Petitioners at 13.
106. Brief for Respondent at 15.
107. 449 U.S. at 348. But see supra note 63.
108. 449 U.S. at 348.
109. 432 U.S. at 106.
110. Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d at 550; Summitt v. Borden-
kircher, 608 F.2d at 252. Compare the Court's discussion of the external factors
supporting the reliability of the identification in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at
201-02.
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tion under the totality of the circumstances."' Thus it is difficult
to see how the petitioners were prejudiced by the defense
counsel's inability to show that suggestive procedures were used,
because even assuming that suggestive procedures were used,
the identifications were found to be sufficiently reliable to be
presented for the jury's determination about credibility.
Justice Brennan noted in dissent that the petitioners here had
made a colorable claim of impermissibly suggestive procedures
and that such a claim should mandate holding a hearing outside
the jury's presence.' 2 As the court of appeals noted, however,
the trial court would be required to make a threshold decision on
what constitutes a colorable claim, a decision which would be dif-
ficult to make without holding the hearing.' 3 This would seem to
impose a per se requirement for the hearing, which would in at
least some cases be a waste of time. The present approach allows
the trial court to use its discretion to discriminate between frivo-
lous and serious claims of unfairness and to act as justice requires
based on the facts of each case.'
It is worth noting that the Court did not decide that a hearing
outside the jury's presence may not ever be required. The cryptic
statement that in some circumstances such a hearing may be
constitutionally necessary" seems to suggest that given a fac-
tual setting where the hypothetical issues raised in Watkins are
actually present,"' a different result may be required. Moreover,
111. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d at 631; Summitt v. Borden-
kircher, 608 F.2d at 252-53. Watkins' exhibition to Goeing was necessary since it
was unclear whether Goeing would survive the shooting. Compare Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. at 302. Watkins' lighter skin made him stand out in the lineup,
but "there is no requirement that a defendant in a lineup must be surrounded
by people nearly identical in appearance." N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 10.2(b)
(quoting People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 661, 602 P.2d 738, 751, 159 Cal. Rptr.
818, 831 (1979)). This facet of suggestiveness was also made known to the trial
court and jury by Watkins' defense counsel. See supra note 105.
112. 449 U.S. 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States ex. rel.
Fisher v. Driber, 546 F.2d at 22.
113. Summitt v. Bordenfircher, 608 F.2d at 251.
114. See United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 407 (7th Cir.
1975) (Stevens, J.); Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d at 1237.
115. 449 U.S. at 349.
116. Compare Foster v. California, 394 U.S. at 443: "In effect, the police
repeatedly aid to the witness, 'This is the man."' Id. It is also possible that the
issue of a jury's ability to disregard instructions might arise in an "other
evidence" case. See N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 1.3.
19821
688 Duquesne Law Review [Vol. 20:637
given the virtual unanimity of opinion in the lower federal courts
that an in camera hearing is preferable,117 it is likely that the
Watkins decision will have little practical impact on federal trial
courts. In any case, many state constitutions may mandate more
stringent procedural requirements."'
Dennis Glass
117. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 181 n.7, 320 A.2d 351, 361 n.7 (1974) (concurring opinion);
N. SOBEL, supra note 46, § 2.3(b).
